Louisiana Law Review
Volume 75 | Number 1
Fall 2014

Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified
Approach to Disparate Impact Under the Fair
Housing Act
Cornelius J. Murray IV

Repository Citation
Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified Approach to Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 La.
L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol75/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified
Approach to Disparate Impact Under the Fair
Housing Act
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ..........................................................................214
I.

Disparate Impact Theory: What it is and Where it
Came From ...........................................................................219
A. Disparate Treatment .......................................................220
B. Disparate Impact ............................................................221
C. The Origins of Disparate Impact in
Employment Law ...........................................................222
1. Early Inklings of Disparate Impact ..........................222
2. Supreme Court Approval of Disparate Impact ........224
D. The Development of Disparate Impact in the
Fair Housing Context .....................................................226

II.

Disparate Impact Today: A Proposal to Resolve the
Theory’s Uncertain Future Under the FHA .........................227
A. The Current State of Disparate Impact Under
the FHA ..........................................................................228
1. A Sign of Things to Come: Ricci v. DeStefano .......228
2. An Opportunity Lost: Magner v. Gallagher ............229
3. A Repeat Performance: Mount Holly v.
Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. .........230
4. Round Three, the Potential Knockout Blow:
Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. ........232
B. A Call to Amend the FHA .............................................236

III. Dissecting Disparate Impact Under the FHA: The
Standard Debate ...................................................................239
A. Examining the Current Standards Employed by
the Circuit Courts: Pros and Cons ..................................240
1. The Burden-Shifting Approach ................................241
2. The Relevance of Intent ............................................244
3. The Balancing Test ..................................................245
4. The Hybrid Approach ..............................................247

214

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

B. Proposing a Proper Standard: The Modified
Burden-Shifting Approach .............................................249
C. Codification: Incorporation of the Modified
Burden-Shifting Approach Into an FHA Amendment ...254
Conclusion ............................................................................255
Appendix A ..........................................................................257
INTRODUCTION
In New Orleans, a cursory examination of the city’s
neighborhoods and surrounding areas tells the story. Lime green
dots shade almost the entirety of Central City, Algiers, Gentilly,
New Orleans East, and the Lower Ninth Ward.1 Conversely, blue
dots predominate in Uptown, Algiers Point, Lakeview, Metairie,
the Garden District, and the French Quarter.2 In Detroit, 8 Mile
Road forms the line of demarcation, blue dots blanketing north of
the road and green dots covering the south.3 Atlanta, Birmingham,
Chicago, and St. Louis present similar pictures.4 The colored dots
reflect data from the 2010 Census: one dot for every individual;
green represents blacks, and blue represents whites.5 The images
described come from “the most comprehensive map of race in
America ever created.”6 The map—particularly the close-ups of
individual cities—shows conclusively that racial segregation
continues to plague this country’s residential communities.7
Although a few cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles have more integrated neighborhoods, racial segregation
proves to be the norm.8
Copyright 2014, by CORNELIUS J. MURRAY IV.
1. Dustin A. Cable, The Racial Dot Map, WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB.
SERV., UNIV. OF VA., http://demographics.coopercenter.org/DotMap/index.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7MEA-7WUH.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Further, red represents Asians, orange represents Hispanics, and
brown represents all others. Id.
6. Kyle Vanhemert, The Best Map Ever Made of America’s Racial
Segregation, WIRED (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/design
/2013/08/how-segregated-is-your-city-this-eye-opening-map-shows-you/?viewall
=true, archived at http://perma.cc/X6XX-CWG3 (presenting the work of Dustin
Cable, a statistician at the University of Virginia).
7. See Cable, supra note 1.
8. Id.
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Almost 50 years ago, the passage of the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) provided a potential solution to the segregation of
American neighborhoods.9 A primary purpose of the FHA, “which
was passed as an immediate response to Dr. King’s assassination,
was to replace the ghettos with ‘truly integrated and balanced
living patterns.’”10 Congress believed that the FHA’s ban on
discriminatory housing practices would lead to more integrated
communities.11 However, as scholars have noted and census data
indicates, truly integrated communities have not emerged.12
Despite the passage of the FHA, one of the primary causes of
America’s segregated communities continues to be housing
discrimination.13 “Each year, tens of thousands of FHA complaints
are filed, and these complaints represent ‘only a fraction of
instances of housing discrimination’ that actually occur annually,
which is estimated to be about 4,000,000.”14
One tool for fighting housing discrimination, in addition to the
well-established disparate treatment doctrine,15 is disparate impact
theory.16 As opposed to disparate treatment, which only targets
practices motivated by discriminatory intent, disparate impact
focuses on practices that have discriminatory effects on protected
classes of people. Legal scholars disagree on the ultimate purpose
of the disparate impact theory; some claim that it is meant solely to

9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012).
10. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated
Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s
“Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 125 (2012) (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).
11. See 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968). Senator Mondale stated that the goal
of the FHA was to replace the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.” Id.
12. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 125, 132–33 (noting that American
Apartheid, a 1990s commentary on segregation in this country, recognized that
racial segregation is “the principal organizational feature of American society”
and that the 2010 census data indicates that “the United States is still a
residentially segregated society”).
13. Id. at 134 (“Another cause of segregation is housing discrimination
against racial minorities . . . .”); Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty,
Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 65 (1998)
(“African Americans found themselves limited to de facto segregated
geographies by public and private discrimination.”).
14. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 134–35 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR
HOUSING 2 (2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2008
annual-rpt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4GG4-XVBX).
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
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provide for inadvertent, effects-based liability,17 while others argue
that it is designed to smoke out well-disguised unlawful intent,18
but the practical reality is that it can be used to fight effectively
against both.19 Over the past 40 years, though, FHA plaintiffs have
had little success with disparate impact claims.20 Scholars have
attributed the theory’s failure to the lack of a clear standard,21
which is the result of a circuit split over the proper analysis,22 as
well as the theory’s use as a “Plan B” to disparate treatment
claims,23 which very well could be the consequence of disparate
impact’s illusory analytical framework. Either way, disparate
impact’s failure has contributed to the persistence of housing
discrimination, and far too many instances go unchallenged.24
Rather than looking to resolve the circuit split over the proper
standard, the Supreme Court appears destined to read disparate

17. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with
Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Anti-Discrimination Law, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1198 (2007) [hereinafter Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to
Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?].
18. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987).
19. See infra Part III.
20. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393 (2013) [hereinafter Seicshnaydre, Is
Disparate Impact Having Any Impact?] (“What is abundantly clear when
analyzing the FHA disparate impact case law over the past forty years is that the
appellate courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate
impact claims under the FHA. . . . [P]laintiffs have received positive decisions in
less than 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate impact claims
considered on appeal.”).
21. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A Coherent Test for Disparate Impact
Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 774–75 (2009) (claiming that a lack of
coherency involving disparate impact standards in both the employment and fair
housing contexts likely factors into a potential plaintiff’s decision whether to
bring suit). See also Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact in
Fair Housing Act Claims: Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher
Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1991 (2010) (explaining that a lack of
clarity regarding the discriminatory effects test has raised questions of how and
when to use an FHA disparate impact analysis in the context of Section 8
voucher discrimination claims).
22. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
23. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1148–49; Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact
Having Any Impact?, supra note 20, at 393.
24. See supra note 14.
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impact theory out of the FHA.25 The Court first signaled the
theory’s eventual demise with its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, an
employment discrimination case.26 Moreover, the Court’s recent
desire to address the viability of disparate impact under the FHA,27
despite no circuit split on that issue,28 further indicates that the
theory’s days are likely numbered.29 With this in mind, fair
25. See Stephanie Sheeley, Settlement in Mount Holly, New Jersey, THE
FHACTS: T HE F AIR H OUSING A CTION C ENTER B LOG (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2013/11/25/settlement-in-mount-holly-new-jersey/,
archived at http://perma.cc/F3KQ-9DZW (“Many commentators speculated that
today’s conservative-leaning Supreme Court would have decided the question in a
way that contravened all of the other courts to have ever ruled on the issue and
similarly contravened established, previously uncontroversial principles of law.”);
see infra Part I.E.
26. 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (remarking that this
decision “merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to
confront the question” of whether disparate impact theory violates the Equal
Protection Clause). See infra Part II.A.1.
27. Since 2011, the Court has granted certiorari in three cases presenting the
issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. See
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court
orders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. Oct.
2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012).
28. All 11 circuits that have considered whether the FHA includes a
disparate-impact standard have found in the affirmative. Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). See 2922 Sherman
Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002); Reg’l Econ.
Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir.
2002); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658
F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert.
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381,
1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781,
790 (6th Cir. 1996); East-Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558,
563 (7th Cir. 2005); Keller v. City of Freemont, 719 F.3d 931, 948 (8th Cir.
2013); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir.
1996); Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2007);
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1217 (11th Cir. 2008).
29. The Court reverses roughly two-thirds of the cases on which it grants
certiorari, indicating, in this case, a potential desire to overturn the near-unanimous
approval of an FHA disparate-impact standard by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See
Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reversals: Exploring the Seventh Circuit, 32 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 641, 643–44 (2008) (noting that from 2001 through 2006 the Court’s
reversal rate has been at a “consistent high of 70% or above”); see also Circuit
Scorecard: October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), http://scotus
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/scorecards_OT12.pdf, archived at http:
//perma.cc/ZF6P-6NTB (showing a 72% overall reversal rate for October Term
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housing advocates have worked to keep the theory afloat by
pushing for out-of-court settlements before the Supreme Court can
speak on the issue.30 In 2013, the Court granted certiorari in
Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey v. Mount Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action to decide whether the FHA supports disparate
impact claims.31 Yet, a month before the case was set for oral
argument, the parties settled and kept the Court from addressing
the disparate impact issue.32 Similarly, an out-of-court settlement
ended the Court’s first attempt to address disparate impact under
the FHA in the 2011 case of Gallagher v. Magner.33 Although
settling cases out from under the Court has temporarily avoided the
Court’s seemingly inevitable rejection of FHA disparate impact
claims,34 this issue is far from resolved.
In the 2014–2015 Term, the Court picked up the issue once
again in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.35 And while the ultimate
outcome of Inclusive Communities is still unknown, only two
results appear likely: Civil rights advocates will succeed in pushing
for another settlement, or the Court will finally strike down
disparate impact under the FHA. Either way, Congress must act to
permanently guarantee the use of disparate impact theory in fair

2012); Circuit Scorecard: October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2012),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_scorecard_OT11
_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/492Q-2QJ9 (showing a 63% overall reversal
rate for October Term 2011).
30. See Greg Stohr, Landmark Housing Law Challenged in High Court Bias
Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2014-10-02/texas-housing-bias-case-gets-u-s-supreme-court-review.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/73CN-UMEP; Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before
It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-supreme-court.html?_r=0,
archived at http: //perma.cc/QVG3-XKEM.
31. 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).
32. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mount Holly Settlement Update, JDSUPRA BUSINESS
ADVISOR (Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mount
-holly-settlement-update-34745/, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZV9-YVPR.
33. Lyle Denniston, Fair Housing Case Dismissed, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10,
2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/fair-housing-case-dismissed,
archived at http://perma.cc/YG65-9M7F; Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012).
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371).
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housing by amending the FHA to explicitly include a disparate
impact cause of action.
This Comment proposes a congressional response to the
outcome in Inclusive Communities (whether by way of settlement
or Supreme Court opinion) that will statutorily guarantee disparate
impact claims within the Fair Housing Act, while also providing a
statutorily-mandated “modified burden-shifting” standard for the
clear, uniform, and effective adjudication of such claims. The FHA
must continue to provide plaintiffs with the ability to raise
disparate impact claims to effectively combat housing
discrimination and facilitate an integrated society. Further, FHA
disparate impact claims require a new, uniform standard for courts
to apply with a structure reflecting the Act’s purpose so that
instances of discrimination decline and the majority of those that
do occur do not continue to go unchallenged.36
The first Part of this Comment defines the disparate impact
theory, explains the difference between it and disparate treatment,
and traces its history from the employment context to fair housing
law. Part II then addresses the current state of the theory under the
FHA and proposes a congressional amendment that will guarantee
a future for disparate impact claims under the FHA. After
acknowledging that disparate impact in its current form is not
perfect, Part III identifies the current deficiencies within the FHA
disparate impact framework and proposes a solution: a modified
burden-shifting standard. It then highlights the strength of this
approach over other potential methods for rectifying the issues
with disparate impact in the fair housing context and explains how
the new standard can be incorporated into an amendment to the
FHA. The pervasive racial segregation within today’s American
communities—nearly half of a century after the passage of the
FHA—is unacceptable. This Comment proposes a solution to the
issues and uncertainty surrounding disparate impact under the
FHA, and in doing so, aims to provide potential litigants with a
tool for eradicating the discriminatory housing practices that
further residential segregation.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY: WHAT IT IS AND WHERE IT CAME
FROM
The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap in the
sale, rental, or financing of housing.37 It also makes unlawful any
36. See supra note 14.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3607 (2012).
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other practices that deny housing, or make housing unavailable, on
the basis of an individual’s membership in any of the these
protected classes.38 Plaintiffs in FHA cases have two primary
avenues through which to obtain relief: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.39
A. Disparate Treatment
Under the FHA, disparate treatment refers to housing practices
that intentionally treat similarly situated persons differently.40 In
other words, a practice qualifies as disparate treatment if it applies
rules to a protected set of people that are different from the rules
that it applies to others.41 Take for instance a real estate agent who
meets with two prospective tenants that have responded to an
advertisement for a rental property.42 One of the prospective
tenants is white and the other is black.43 The agent tells the white
prospective tenant that the rental unit is a one-bedroom home
available at $700 per month and that a deposit and first month’s
38. Id.
39. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 381 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring)
(“We have previously held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of the FHA
by showing that the defendant has an intent to discriminate (‘disparate
treatment’) or that an otherwise neutral practice has a disparate impact on a
protected class (‘disparate impact’).”); Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d
1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Discrimination may occur either by disparate
treatment or disparate impact.”).
40. Reinhart, 482 F.3d at 1229 (“A disparate-treatment claim requires proof
of ‘differential treatment of similarly situated persons or groups;’ the
discrimination must be intentional.” (citations omitted)).
41. Sharpvisions, Inc. v. Borough of Plum, 475 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (W.D.
Pa. 2007) (“Disparate treatment, under the FHA, may be shown by
‘demonstrating that a given legislative provision discriminates against the
handicapped on its face, i.e. applies different rules to the disabled than are
applied to others.’” (quoting Arc of N.J., Inc. v. New Jersey, 950 F. Supp. 637,
643 (D.N.J. 1996))).
42. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir. 1999). For the purposes of this hypothetical, the facts were
changed slightly to more clearly demonstrate the disparate treatment theory. In
Harris, the real estate agent spoke to the prospective tenants over the phone
when making the discriminatory statements. Id. at 1053. Although some may
argue that racial discrimination is not possible via phone conversation because
the alleged offender cannot actually see the other person’s race, courts have held
otherwise. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2003)
(describing telephone tests of landlord compliance with the FHA as evidence of
housing discrimination); Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that punitive damages are available in a case involving a telephone
test).
43. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 1048.
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rent will be needed to secure the home.44 Then, while speaking to
the black individual, the agent describes the rental as a small unit
in a bad neighborhood.45 The agent tells the black prospective
tenant that he or she will have to contact the owner about the terms
of the rental and that the cost of the unit may increase depending
on how many people will occupy it.46 This real estate agent has
violated the FHA by intentionally treating the individuals
differently based on their race, and the black individual would
have a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA.47
B. Disparate Impact
On the other hand, disparate impact refers to practices that, on
their face, appear non-discriminatory but actually, or predictably,
lead to a disproportionate effect on members of a protected class.48
Take, for example, a lending institution that offers loans to
homeowners and prospective homeowners in urban areas.49 That
institution, however, has a policy that it only makes loans to
individuals whose homes (or prospective homes) have values
greater than $100,000.50 In the urban areas in which the lender
operates, though, the vast majority of homeowners whose
properties are valued at less than $100,000 are black and
Hispanic.51 Accordingly, the vast majority of available homes at
less than $100,000 lie in predominantly black and Hispanic
neighborhoods, meaning that black and Hispanic individuals are
more likely to try to acquire funding for homes in those areas.52
Under this program, the lender denies a significant majority of loan
applications for funding of homes in predominantly black and
Hispanic neighborhoods, and thus black and Hispanic homeowners
and prospective homeowners are denied loans at a significantly
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1053–54.
48. Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A
disparate-impact claim, on the other hand, challenges a facially neutral policy
that ‘actually or predictably results in . . . discrimination.’” (quoting Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988))).
49. See generally Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home
Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008).
50. Complaint at 2, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home
Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-01357EGS).
51. Id.
52. Id.

222

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

higher rate than white applicants.53 The lender’s policy, although
facially neutral, has a disproportionate effect on minority
individuals.54 Consequently, the lender’s practice could be deemed
a violation of the FHA under the disparate impact theory.55
However, disparate impact did not originate in the fair housing
context. Rather, it emerged in the world of employment law and
courts then extended it by analogy to the FHA.56 The theory’s
development, though, has been marked with controversy and
confusion.57
C. The Origins of Disparate Impact in Employment Law
From the inception of the Civil Rights Acts, courts and
scholars alike recognized that liability for practices with a
discriminatory effect was integral to effective enforcement of the
Acts.58 Seniority and testing systems used by employers for
promotions and hiring decisions provided the impetus for this
discovery.59 Two cases in particular laid the groundwork for the
development of disparate impact theory in employment law.60
1. Early Inklings of Disparate Impact
In 1968, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., equated the
53. See id.
54. See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
55. Id.
56. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
57. See infra Part III; Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved
with Good Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1141 (“[T]he theory remains
misunderstood, mislabeled, and misused.”).
58. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519 (E.D. Va.
1968); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 983 (5th
Cir. 1969); George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under
Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969); Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967)
[hereinafter Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent
Negro].
59. Seniority systems refer to promotion policies used by employers that
rely on the amount of time an employee has worked in a certain department,
while testing systems refer to hiring policies used by employers that require
prospective employees to pass certain intelligence tests in order to be considered
for employment. See Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 512–13; United Papermakers,
416 F.2d at 983; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
60. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 712 (2006).
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use of seniority systems with a discriminatory effect to intentional
discrimination.61 The court stated “that the defendants . . .
intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices by
discriminating on the ground of race against [the plaintiff], and
other Negroes similarly situated. This discrimination, embedded in
seniority and transfer provisions of collective bargaining
agreements, adversely affect[ed] the conditions of employment and
opportunities for advancement of the class.”62 Just a year later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed this
concept more fully.
In Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the discriminatory effect of an employer’s
seniority system used for making promotion decisions.63 The
system awarded promotions to what were “whites-only” jobs on
the basis of seniority attained in other formerly “whites-only” jobs,
in effect barring African-American employees from receiving such
promotions.64 The court concluded that “[w]hen an employer
adopts a system that necessarily carries forward the incidents of
discrimination into the present, his practice constitutes on-going
discrimination, unless the incidents are limited to those that safety
and efficiency require.”65 Despite the practice being facially
neutral, the court determined that it had a discriminatory effect
relating back to the days of lawful employment discrimination,
thus violating Title VII.66 With this recognition, the Fifth Circuit
took an early step towards establishing disparate impact theory.67
However, the Supreme Court did not officially sanction the use of
effects-based liability under Title VII until two years after United
Papermakers.68

61. Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 519.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. United Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 983.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 994.
66. Id. at 997.
67. Academics also played a significant role in this historic decision. Selmi,
supra note 60, at 712. In fact, the court in United Papermakers relied heavily on
two articles published in the Harvard Law Review. In 1969, two well-known
legal scholars argued that employers’ use of test scores and seniority to make
hiring and promotion decisions was unlawful discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 58.
Similarly, student commentators contended in another article that facially
neutral seniority systems have a discriminatory effect on African-Americans and
that Title VII should provide a remedy. See generally Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, supra note 58.
68. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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2. Supreme Court Approval of Disparate Impact
In 1971, the Supreme Court approved disparate impact liability
with its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.69 In Griggs,
African-American plaintiffs challenged Duke Power Company’s
requirement that employees have a high school education and pass
an intelligence test to obtain employment in any department other
than labor.70 Reversing the district and appellate court decisions,
which held for the employer on the grounds that there was “no
showing of discriminatory purpose,”71 the Supreme Court found
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”72
The Court further stated that “Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation.”73
With this interpretation of Title VII, the Supreme Court
established the disparate impact theory and opened up employers
to greater Title VII liability.74 Yet, the Court chose to narrowly
tailor its holding by stating that “[i]f an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”75 Consequently,
disparate impact claims only survived if the employer’s practice
proved unrelated to the job in question.76 Although the Griggs
decision now stands out as a landmark in civil rights law,
practically speaking, it provided little interruption to the status quo
of the time because courts readily accepted employers’
justifications for their discriminatory employment practices.77 This
trend continued: “By the end of the theory’s first decade, the Court
had rejected more challenges than it had accepted . . . . A theory
that burst onto the scene in 1971 ended its first decade with a
whimper . . . [and] the two ensuing decades simply confirmed the
theory’s limited reach . . . .”78
The Court’s next key disparate impact decision was Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, where the Supreme Court lessened the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
Selmi, supra note 60, at 708.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
Selmi, supra note 60, at 721.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 733–34.
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employer’s burden even further.79 The Court held that employers
“need not show that their job qualifications were justified by
business necessity in the strictest sense.”80 Rather, the Court
concluded that “the dispositive issue is whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer.”81 In addition to the weak substantive
interpretation of business necessity, the Court also placed the
procedural burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to disprove
business necessity.82 The Court’s decision emphatically reaffirmed
the employer-friendly nature of the disparate impact standard.
After Wards Cove, the standard for analyzing Title VII
disparate impact claims placed the initial burden on the employee
to make out a prima facie case.83 The employer could then justify
its practice by showing that it significantly served a legitimate
employment goal, but the employer bore only the burden of
production, not the burden of persuasion.84 The employee could
only overcome the employer’s justification by persuading the factfinder that less-discriminatory alternatives existed.85 Critics of
Wards Cove believed that the Court’s interpretation of the
disparate impact standard undermined the theory’s effectiveness.86
With Wards Cove and other Supreme Court judgments
“threaten[ing] to eviscerate the Griggs decision,”87 Congress
responded by amending Title VII to codify the disparate impact
theory and the appropriate burdens of proof in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.88 With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress narrowed
the definition of business necessity,89 and clearly put the burden of
persuasion on the employer to prove business necessity.90 However,
79. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the
Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV.
1479, 1483 (1996).
80. Spiropoulos, supra note 79, at 1501; Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S.
at 659 (“[T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or
‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business . . . .”).
81. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 657.
84. Id. at 659.
85. Id. at 659–60.
86. Spiropoulos, supra note 79, at 1503–04.
87. Selmi, supra note 60, at 703.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
89. However, the amendment’s definition of business necessity is quite
ambiguous, stating that to present a viable defense the employer must demonstrate
that “the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.” Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
90. Id.
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a precise definition of “business necessity” continues to elude
courts.91
D. The Development of Disparate Impact in the Fair Housing
Context
Just a year after the Court’s decision in Griggs, it took on
another civil rights case that would significantly influence the
development of disparate impact theory. This time, though, the
case arose under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968—the
Fair Housing Act.92 In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court relied on Title VII jurisprudence to
interpret the FHA, setting an important precedent.93 The case arose
when two tenants of a San Francisco apartment complex filed suit
against their landlord under the FHA for discrimination against
nonwhites in the rental process.94 Both the district court and the
court of appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
they were not the focus of the discriminatory housing practice.95
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the
grounds that Congress intended standing under the FHA, like
standing under Title VII, to extend “as broadly as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution.”96 The ultimate takeaways from
Trafficante are that the FHA’s language is “broad and inclusive”—
a phrase that courts still cite today—and that courts should
interpret the Act analogously to Title VII.97
However, analogies to Title VII’s disparate impact theory did
not begin to take hold until 1974. In that year, for the first time, a
federal appellate court found a violation of the FHA based on
discriminatory effects.98 In United States v. City of Black Jack,
Missouri, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the city of Black
Jack’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited the construction of any
91. See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 239–42 (3d Cir.
2007).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012).
93. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
94. The plaintiffs alleged that the complex’s discrimination against nonwhites
in the rental process injured them by depriving them of the social benefits of living
in an integrated community, by depriving them of business and professional
advantages, and by causing embarrassment and stigmatization as residents of a
“white ghetto.” Id. at 207–08.
95. Id. at 208.
96. Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446
(3d Cir. 1971)).
97. Id.
98. See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1974).
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new multiple-family dwellings, violated the FHA.99 Specifically, the
court examined whether the ordinance “operated to preclude
construction of a low to moderate income integrated townhouse
development known as Park View Heights,” which was designed to
provide “alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and
moderate income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis.”100 The
United States alleged in its complaint that the ordinance violated the
FHA by denying persons housing on the basis of race and by
interfering with individuals’ rights to equal housing opportunities.101
In its analysis, the court clarified how a plaintiff can make a prima
facie case under the FHA by stating that the plaintiff must simply
show that the defendant’s actions actually or predictably result in a
discriminatory effect.102 With this statement and its final judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs,103 the Eighth Circuit paved the way for
disparate impact to enter the fair housing world.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT TODAY: A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE
THEORY’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE UNDER THE FHA
Since the Black Jack decision, 40 years of litigation have
supported the belief that the FHA includes a disparate impact
standard.104 All 11 circuits that have considered the issue have
found accordingly.105 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the
issue,106 but the Court appears destined to eliminate disparate
impact theory from fair housing law.107

99. Id. at 1181.
100. Id. at 1181–82. At the time, African-Americans comprised approximately
two-thirds of St. Louis’s population. Id. at 1183. Conversely, African-Americans
comprised only one to two percent of Black Jack’s population. Id.
101. Id. at 1181.
102. Id. at 1184.
103. Id. at 1187–88.
104. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE,
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 3
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DIS
PARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/N5L8-FGWM.
105. See supra note 28.
106. See 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has yet to consider the
availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA.”); SCHWEMM & PRATT,
supra note 104, at 4.
107. See infra Part II.A.
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A. The Current State of Disparate Impact Under the FHA
The Court in recent years has issued opinions dealing with
disparate impact claims under other civil rights statutes, specifying
that each statute’s coverage of such claims must be determined on
the basis of that statute’s particular text and purposes.108 However,
one recent case signaled even greater concerns for the future of the
disparate impact theory as a whole.
1. A Sign of Things to Come: Ricci v. DeStefano
In 2009, the Supreme Court addressed the perceived clash of
disparate impact and disparate treatment and how that clash may
reveal constitutional concerns.109 In Ricci v. DeStefano, white and
Hispanic firefighters sued the city of New Haven, Connecticut, for
refusing to certify the results of a promotional exam.110 The exam,
taken by 118 New Haven firefighters for the chance at a promotion
to the rank of lieutenant or captain, resulted in white firefighters
outperforming minority firefighters.111 In response, the mayor and
other politicians opened up a public debate about the test results
that quickly turned hostile.112 Some firefighters argued that the test
was discriminatory and that the results should be thrown out, while
others demanded that the results be used for making promotions
because the test was fair and neutral.113 Both sides threatened
lawsuits.114 Ultimately, the city threw the results out because it
feared that, if followed, the results would have a disparate impact on
minority firefighters.115 The white and Hispanic firefighters who
would have received promotions responded by filing suit under Title
VII, alleging that the city’s decision not to use the results for making
promotions constituted intentional discrimination.116 The Supreme
Court agreed, holding that an employer must have a “strong basis in
evidence” for believing it will be subject to disparate impact liability
before it can engage in intentional discrimination.117
108. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100).
109. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
110. Id. at 557.
111. Id. at 562.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 563.
116. Id. at 562–63.
117. Id. at 585. The Court in Ricci held that fear of litigation alone was
insufficient to form a strong basis in evidence that an employer would be subject
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In concurrence, Justice Scalia remarked that the majority simply
“postpon[ed] the evil day” when the Court will have to answer
whether disparate impact is consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.118 Without directly stating his take on
the constitutional issue, Scalia indicated that the theory’s days may
be numbered. However, the Court’s preference to avoid
constitutional questions when possible,119 in conjunction with the
fact that the FHA’s language does not explicitly include disparate
impact claims,120 indicates that the Court will likely address the
viability of FHA disparate impact on statutory grounds. In other
words, the Court can dispose of this question by simply stating that
the FHA’s language does not support a disparate impact cause of
action, which will allow it to answer the FHA disparate impact
question without triggering far-reaching consequences within
Equal Protection doctrine. Indeed, the Court’s approach in three
recent FHA disparate impact cases shows that this Court will likely
strike down disparate impact claims under the FHA—if it gets the
chance to do so.121
2. An Opportunity Lost: Magner v. Gallagher
In 2011, the Supreme Court for the first time accepted an
opportunity to review the applicability of disparate impact under the
FHA in the case of Magner v. Gallagher.122 The case arose when
landlords in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, filed suit against the city

to disparate impact liability, id. at 592, but the standard’s precise nature is not
altogether clear as Ricci was the first case in which the Court used the “strong
basis in evidence” language outside of the Equal Protection context. See Herman
N. Johnson, Jr., The Evolving Strong-Basis-In-Evidence Standard, 32 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 349 (2011). However, Professor Herman N. Johnson, Jr.,
has persuasively argued that the Court’s relocation of the standard to Title VII
doctrine marks the transformation of “strong basis in evidence” from a burden of
persuasion to a standard of proof falling below the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard. See generally id.
118. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“The
so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling
that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional
doubts.”).
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3607 (2012).
121. It is likely that civil rights advocates will push for a settlement in the
Inclusive Communities case that now sits before the Court as they did in the
previous two cases in which the Court granted certiorari. See infra Part II.A.2–4.
122. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
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for its aggressive enforcement of the housing codes.123 The
landlords sued under the FHA, arguing that the city’s practices
significantly diminished the supply of affordable housing, which in
turn disproportionately affected low-income minorities.124 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed after
analyzing the claims under the burden-shifting approach.125 The city
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on two
issues: (1) whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA; and (2) if such claims are cognizable, whether they should be
analyzed under the burden shifting approach, under the balancing
test, under a hybrid approach, or by some other test.126
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but never had the
opportunity to decide the case.127 Both parties agreed to drop the
petition after the Department of Justice and civil rights advocates
convinced the city of St. Paul that a Supreme Court ruling on the
case could “substantially undermine civil rights enforcement
throughout the nation.”128 The city’s withdrawal left unanswered
the question of whether the FHA supports disparate impact, a
question that a small town in New Jersey gave the Court the
chance to answer just a short time later.
3. A Repeat Performance: Mount Holly v. Mount Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.
The Court’s next chance to answer the disparate impact
question arose out of the small, seemingly sedate town of Mount
123. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2010).
124. Id. at 833.
125. Id. at 845.
126. Brief for the Petitioners at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012) (No. 10-1032); John W. McGee, Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holley Gardens:
Disparate Impact and the Fair Housing Act, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 429, 447–48
(2013).
127. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 636 (2013).
128. City of St. Paul Seeks to Dismiss United States Supreme Court Case
Magner v. Gallagher, SAINT PAUL MINNESOTA (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.stpaul
.gov/index.aspx?NID=4874, archived at http://perma.cc/LPL3-BCQ4. See also
Denniston, supra note 33; Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Takes Up Challenge to
Disparate-Impact Discrimination Theory, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 11:15 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/06/17/supreme-court-takes-up-chal
lenge-to-disparate-impact-discrimination-theory/, archived at http://perma.cc/8NF
4-9UAM.
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Holly, New Jersey.129 There, the town’s only predominantly black
and Hispanic area,130 a neighborhood known as the Gardens, was
plagued by crime, blight, and overcrowding.131 In response, the
neighborhood’s residents organized a number of efforts in concert
with local authorities to improve conditions,132 but the Township grew
tired of the cooperative approach.133 By 2002, the Township settled on
a “destroy-and-displace” plan,134 the ultimate goal of which was to
construct a brand new development with 520 townhomes and
apartments.135 Because the Township’s redevelopment plan had the
effect of displacing nearly the entirety of the Gardens’ former residents
and eliminating the town’s only neighborhood made up primarily of
minority inhabitants,136 the citizens of Mount Holly Gardens filed
suit alleging a violation of the FHA under the disparate impact
theory.137
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim on summary
judgment, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the lower
court employed the wrong standard and that the plaintiffs’
statistical evidence sufficiently supported a prima facie case of
129. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658
F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert.
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
130. McGee, supra note 126, at 449.
131. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 378.
132. Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 4, Twp. of
Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2012) (No.
11-1507).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. Of those 520 new residences, only 56 were designated to provide
affordable housing—the cost of a new home was “well outside the range of
affordability for a significant portion of the African-American and Hispanic
residents of the Township.” Id. at 8. Moreover, only 11 existing garden residents
would be offered priority status. Id. at 6.
136. The Gardens originally had over 300 homes and now only 70 remain
under the private ownership of Gardens residents. Id. at 1. Additionally, even
though the Township paid for 62 families to relocate, only 20 of them were able
to remain in Mount Holly. Id. at 8. The looming elimination of the Gardens
threatened to significantly diminish the town’s minority population by removing
27.2% of African-American residents and 30.9% of Hispanic residents, thus
drastically increasing the proportion of Caucasians in Mount Holly from 65.6% to
75.9%. Compare id. at 3, with 2010 Census Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics for Township of Mount Holly, NJ, http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor
/lpa/census/2010/dp/dp1_bur/mountholly1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TZ54RX7 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). Demographic characteristics of the Gardens taken
from Respondents’ Brief divided by the demographic characteristics for the town as
a whole taken from the state website reveal the cited statistics. Id.
137. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert.
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
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disparate impact.138 The court then remanded for further findings
on whether the town demonstrated that no less-discriminatory
alternatives existed.139 After the town appealed the Third Circuit’s
ruling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
disparate impact claims are even cognizable under the FHA, but
declined to resolve the circuit split over the appropriate standard.140
However, as in Magner, the parties agreed to settle their dispute
out of court just weeks before oral argument was set to take
place.141 The reason for the settlement, again as in Magner, was a
push from civil rights advocates to keep the issue out of the
Court’s hands because of the Court’s perceived opposition to the
disparate impact theory.142 Although fair housing advocates’
methods for ensuring disparate impact will likely prove ineffective
in the end, their perception that the Court will sink the disparate
impact theory in fair housing law appears valid.143
4. Round Three, the Potential Knockout Blow: Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.
In a move that only reinforces the perception that disparate
impact under the FHA is doomed, the Court has granted certiorari
to once again consider the validity of disparate impact claims
under the FHA in Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.144 The case arose
when the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a nonprofit
organization that assists “low-income, predominantly African138. Id.
139. Id. at 385–86.
140. Wendy M. Garbers, Angela E. Kleine, & Thomas J. Noto, Supreme
Court Takes Up Landmark Disparate Impact Case, Again, Over U.S.
Objections, MORRISON FOERSTER (June 19, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files
/Uploads/Images/130619-SCOTUS-Disparate-Impact.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/DLN5-3WHM.
141. Kaplinsky, supra note 32.
142. Brian J. Connolly, U.S. Supreme Court Fair Housing Case Settles,
Disparate Impact Stays Put For Now, ROCKY MOUNTAIN REAL EST. LAW (Nov.
14, 2013), http://www.rockymountainrealestatelaw.com/us-supreme-court-fairhousing-act-case-settles-disparate-impact-stays-put-for-now/, archived at http:
//perma.cc/NSX6-SSZX (“Fair housing advocates, including the Obama
administration, have sought to prevent the FHA disparate impact issue from
reaching the Supreme Court . . . .”). See supra Part II.A.1.
143. See supra Part II.A.1.
144. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371).
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American families . . . in finding affordable housing in
predominantly Caucasian, suburban neighborhoods” around Dallas,
filed suit against the Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs (TDHCA).145 ICP alleged that TDHCA violated the FHA
under both disparate treatment theory and disparate impact theory
by distributing Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in a
discriminatory manner.146 Specifically, “ICP alleged that [TDHCA
was] disproportionately approving tax credit units in minorityconcentrated neighborhoods and disproportionately disapproving tax
credit units in predominately Caucasian neighborhoods, thereby
creating a concentration of the units in minority areas, a lack of units
in other areas, and maintaining and perpetuating segregated housing
patterns.”147
The district court found that ICP failed to meet its burden of
establishing intentional discrimination, but held that ICP
successfully proved a violation of the FHA based on disparate
impact.148 The defendants appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the appellate court addressed
only whether the lower court was correct in finding a violation of
the FHA based on disparate impact.149 Acknowledging the
viability of disparate impact under the FHA, the Fifth Circuit
began by explicitly adopting a three-step burden-shifting standard
for analyzing disparate impact claims, the same standard that was
recently adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)—the agency responsible for administering
and enforcing the FHA.150 After adopting the burden-shifting
approach, the court then remanded the case so that the district court
could apply the correct legal standard.151 However, after the
defendants appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on whether disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the FHA; and again as in Mt. Holly, the Court
ignored the second issue presented as to what standard should
apply.152
The fact that the Court granted certiorari in Mt. Holly just two
years after losing Magner, and then granted certiorari in Inclusive
145. Id. at 277–78.
146. See id. at 278–79.
147. Id. at 278.
148. See id. at 279–80.
149. See id. at 280.
150. See id. at 282.
151. See id. at 283.
152. See generally id.; Orders in Pending Cases, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Oct.
2, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (granting certiorari in No. 13-1371).
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Communities less than a year after losing Mt. Holly, reveals its
burning desire to address disparate impact theory under the FHA.
However, the only major dispute between the circuit courts is the
appropriate standard for adjudicating disparate impact cases,153 not
whether the FHA supports disparate impact claims.154 Yet, the
Court in Inclusive Communities and Mt. Holly declined to grant
certiorari on that issue, instead only considering the issue of
whether the FHA supports the theory at all.155 The Court’s decision
to refuse review of the circuit split over the proper standard
indicates that the Court found it unnecessary to resolve, suggesting
that the impetus for granting certiorari was to end disparate
impact’s run under the FHA. One could contend that such an
outcome is not inevitable because it only takes four votes to grant
certiorari but five to garner a majority opinion.156 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court’s recent trend of reversing the vast majority of
cases on which it grants certiorari supports the prediction that this
Court will strike down disparate impact under the FHA—an
unacceptable result for those interested in guaranteeing fair
housing for all.
“The FHA’s purpose is to ensure fair housing for all
individuals throughout the United States and to end discrimination
against protected classes of persons based on prejudice, stereotypes
or ignorance in the provision of housing.”157 If the Supreme Court
were to read disparate impact out of the FHA, it would make
achieving this goal next to impossible because of the difficulty of
proving intentional discrimination.158 With disparate impact
eliminated from the FHA, the only enforcement tool left to wronged
individuals would be a claim of disparate treatment, which has
153. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
154. See supra note 28.
155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013). See Garbers et al., supra note 140.
156. See Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the
Rule of Four—or is it Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2002).
157. Katherine Brinson, Justifying Discrimination: How the Ninth Circuit
Circumvented the Intent of the Fair Housing Act, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
489, 492 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968)). See also Bangerter v. Orem
City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the purpose of the
Fair Housing Act amendments to extend the same protections to individuals
with disabilities).
158. See infra note 159.

2014]

COMMENT

235

limited effectiveness. As courts, scholars, and the drafters of the
FHA have noted, “explicit discriminatory intent is exceptionally
difficult to prove,”159 thus making disparate impact all the more
important. Not only would such a decision put the FHA’s goals out
of reach, but it would also contradict the intent of the FHA’s
drafters and initial supporters in Congress.160 For instance, Senator
Walter Mondale, the Act’s principal sponsor, stated that “it seems
only fair, and is constitutional, that Congress should now pass a
fair housing act to undo the effects” of past discrimination.161
Disparate impact has significant potential as an “evidentiary
dragnet” for holding entities and individuals involved in housing
transactions liable when they cloak their discriminatory intent under a
veil of legitimacy.162 Moreover, it provides a mechanism for fighting
159. John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and
the Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 171 n.165
(2002) (citing United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783
(N.D. Miss. 1972) (“The Court recognizes that ‘most persons will not admit
publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice against members of the Negro
Race.’”)); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 (D.N.J.
2000) (quoting Horizon Hous. Dev. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Southhampton,
804 F. Supp. 683, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1992)) (“[I]t is unusual that a [FHA defendant]
will openly reveal that he or she acted on the basis of discriminatory intent.”);
SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 11 (“The FHA’s legislative history also
demonstrates that Congress was aware of the difficulty of proving
discriminatory intent and, because of this difficulty, allowed other forms of
proof. Senator Baker introduced a floor amendment that would have exempted
from liability any homeowner who engaged a real estate agent ‘without
indicating any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race . . . , or an
intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.’ The Baker
amendment would have made such homeowners liable only if they intentionally
discriminated. A number of the bill’s supporters objected that the amendment
would undermine Congress’s purpose by making proof of discrimination
difficult in all but the most blatant cases. The Baker amendment was defeated.”
(citations omitted)).
160. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 11 (“Proponents of the FHA
emphasized that the facially neutral practices of private and public actors were a
principal cause of residential segregation, which the Act aimed to eliminate. One
of the Act’s leading supporters, Senator Brooke, noted that African Americans
could not move to better neighborhoods because they were ‘surrounded by a
pattern of discrimination based on individual prejudice, often institutionalized
by business and industry, and Government practices.’ Senator Mondale, the
Act’s principal sponsor, explained that after the Supreme Court had prohibited
explicitly racial zoning laws in 1917, ‘[l]ocal ordinances with the same effect,
although operating more deviously in an attempt to avoid the Court’s
prohibition, were still being enacted.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 114 CONG
REC. 2526, 2669 (1968))).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 520 (2003) (Under the view of disparate impact
as an evidentiary dragnet for deliberate discrimination, the “disparate impact
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segregation by prohibiting housing practices that inadvertently have a
disproportionate effect on minority populations and perpetuate
residential segregation.163 An accurate understanding of the policy
underlying the FHA and a broad reading of its language command the
inclusion of a disparate impact cause of action.164
B. A Call to Amend the FHA
Notable disparate impact scholars Robert G. Schwemm and
Sara K. Pratt have previously proposed administrative regulations
as a means for guaranteeing disparate impact under the FHA.165
However, HUD has since employed that approach, and its
regulations are already being challenged in court.166 The Supreme
Court again has the opportunity to address disparate impact under
the FHA, and with its current ideological composition, an
administrative regulation is unlikely to withstand the Court’s
apparent distaste for disparate impact theory.167 Accordingly, those
interested in guaranteeing a future for disparate impact in fair
housing must target their efforts towards Congress and persuade it
to codify disparate impact by amending the FHA, no matter the
result in Inclusive Communities. Even if advocates pull this case
away from the Court as they have in the past, Congress still must
act because the Court appears determined to speak on this issue.
And if the Court ends up striking down disparate impact under the
FHA on this go-around, then Congress must respond in order to
ensure the Act’s effectiveness is rooting out discriminatory
practices.

doctrine is a prophylactic measure that is necessary because deliberate
discrimination can be difficult to prove.”).
163. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1144–45.
164. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
165. See generally SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104.
166. Deepak Gupta, Town Council to Meet on Settlement in Mount Holly
Tonight, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER LAW AND POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/town-council-tomeet-on-settlement-in-mount-holly-tonight.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9U
VD-F58V (noting that a settlement would shift focus to American Insurance
Ass’n v. HUD, where HUD’s regulation is being challenged in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia).
167. The Court’s recent approach towards disparate impact under the FHA
leads to the supposition that the Court does not believe the FHA’s language
supports disparate impact, meaning that an administrative regulation would
likely receive no deference. See supra Part II.A.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
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Just as it did in response to Wards Cove in the employment
context,168 Congress should respond to the Supreme Court by
revising the FHA to explicitly support disparate impact claims.
First, Congress needs to include within the FHA language that
explicitly provides for disparate impact liability. Luckily for the
legislature, experts in the field have already done much of the
legwork. Schwemm and Pratt’s proposal in Disparate Impact
Under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed Approach includes a
model regulation based on language in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.169 Although they intended their recommendation for use by
HUD, the proposed language works effectively as an amendment
to the FHA. Schwemm and Pratt’s articulation provides not only
explicit recognition of a disparate impact cause of action but also
relevant definitions required for its interpretation.170 By adding
such language into the FHA, Congress can clearly establish
168. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
169. The text of the model regulation reads as follows:
Unjustified discriminatory impact: Prohibited actions for purposes of
this subsection include employing any practice that has an adverse
impact based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national
origin, or handicap unless that practice is shown by the party
employing it to have a legally sufficient justification.
For purposes of this subsection:
–“practice” includes any practice, policy, procedure, process,
standard, elements of practices, policies, procedures, processes, or
standards that are not capable of being separated for analysis, and any
other action that is intended to evaluate or affect a group of persons.
–“adverse impact” means a substantially different rate of selection
which works to the disadvantage of members of a race, sex, ethnic
group, religion, [etc.]. The term “substantially” means the same as it
has been interpreted in prior judicial and HUD administrative
decisions under this Act and in prior judicial decisions and
administrative regulations under Title VII.
–a “legally sufficient justification” is one that (1) furthers one or more
of the user’s legitimate, non-discriminatory interests; and (2) cannot
be served by an alternative practice with a less discriminatory impact.
A “legally sufficient justification” must:
-bear a manifest relationship to the practice that is challenged;
-have a significant correlation with important elements of the
operation of the housing opportunity or business;
-involve a matter of substantial concern to the operation of the
housing opportunity or business; and, be more effective in
accomplishing its purpose than a less discriminatory alternative.
A “legal[ly] sufficient justification” may not:
-be hypothetical, speculative, or insubstantial; or
-be facially discriminatory or otherwise reflect an intent to discriminate
on a prohibited basis.
SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 28–29.
170. See id.
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disparate impact under the FHA. The next question is where to
incorporate such language into the FHA’s structure.
Schwemm and Pratt’s proposal again provides guidance. Their
proposed approach discusses options for the placement of disparate
impact language within HUD’s current fair housing regulations.171
Although HUD’s regulations differ from the FHA, Schwemm and
Pratt’s recommendations still prove useful. One of their
suggestions is to include the disparate impact language in “those
parts of the regulations providing overall coverage of the FHA’s
substantive prohibitions.”172 Accordingly, Congress can look to
include the disparate impact provision within the substantive
sections of the FHA that provide overall coverage, which include
sections 3604, 3605, and 3606.173 Adding the disparate impact
language to these sections would clearly establish that public and
private entities engaged in housing transactions are subject to
liability for any practice with a discriminatory effect.
Some may contend that an amendment to the FHA is premature
given the recent success of fair housing advocates in facilitating
settlements. The argument goes: If advocates can push for
settlements in Inclusive Communities and future cases, then there
remains no risk to disparate impact under the FHA. However, such
an approach is shortsighted. It allows the effectiveness of the FHA
to dwindle as defendants are now keenly aware that fair housing
advocates and the Department of Justice would rather encourage
settlements than let the Court decide the issue.174
This knowledge gives defendants the upper hand in
negotiations. Defendants can effectively hold the threat of moving
forward in litigation over plaintiffs to obtain one-sided settlement
terms. Essentially, some defendants will be able to escape liability
because of plaintiffs’ and amici’s fear of the Court striking down
disparate impact. Of course, critics of this proposal can argue that
this is the nature of litigation and settlements—the party that fears it
will lose at the next level has less leverage in negotiations. This may
be true, but ideally, interested parties would look to the Court for
clarification of the law rather than fearing such pronouncements.
Such a state of affairs undermines the purpose of the legal system—
to fairly and justly adjudicate cases and controversies—by
permitting fear of the judiciary to dictate outcomes rather than truth,
justice, and equity.

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 29.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2012).
See Connolly, supra note 142.
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However, disparate impact in its current form under the FHA is
not flawless. Thus far, it has proven ineffective in eradicating
housing discrimination.175 This Comment contends that disparate
impact’s failures to date are not the result of any inherent
inadequacy but rather a lack of clarity regarding its use under the
FHA. Accordingly, when Congress amends the FHA to explicitly
include disparate impact claims, it must also resolve the circuit
split over the appropriate analytical standard and include a single
standard in the amendment. That inevitably raises the question:
What standard should Congress adopt?
III. DISSECTING DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FHA: THE
STANDARD DEBATE
The disparate impact theory has proven to be a generally
ineffective tool for FHA plaintiffs over the past forty years.176
FHA plaintiffs asserting disparate impact claims have been
unsuccessful in roughly 80% of the cases that reach the federal
circuit courts.177 The fact that approximately 4,000,000 instances
of housing discrimination occur annually,178 yet only 18 FHA
plaintiffs (as of 2013) have succeeded on their disparate impact
claims at the federal appellate level, demonstrates that the theory is
failing to root out discriminatory housing practices.179
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, a professor at Tulane University Law
School and a frequent commentator on disparate impact under the
FHA, suggests that one primary reason for disparate impact’s
ineffectiveness under the FHA is that plaintiffs typically use
disparate impact as a “Plan B” to disparate treatment claims, thus
not fully developing an appropriate disparate impact claim.180 A
logical explanation for plaintiffs’ misuse of the disparate impact
theory is the lack of clarity resulting from inconsistent standards
among the circuit courts, which other scholars have acknowledged
as the underlying cause of the theory’s deficiencies.181 The absence
of coherent standards for proving disparate impact liability has the
consequence of discouraging potential plaintiffs,182 and perhaps
175. See supra notes 14, 20 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 20.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 20.
180. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1148–49; Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact
Having Any Impact?, supra note 20, at 393.
181. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
182. See Peresie, supra note 21, at 774–75.
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their lawyers as well. Moreover, it prevents public and private
entities engaged in housing transactions from truly understanding
their obligations under the law.183 A clear and predictable standard
would clarify the rights and responsibilities of persons seeking
housing and persons or entities engaged in housing transactions,
thus reducing litigation.184 When public and private entities
engaged in housing transactions understand their obligations, they
will, in most cases, comply to avoid costly litigation.185 As these
entities comply with the FHA, the number of discriminatory
housing practices should decrease and segregation should begin to
subside. Consequently, a clear and predictable analytical standard
is a necessity for the effective enforcement of the FHA.
Although Seicshnaydre contends that disparate impact’s failure
under the FHA requires elimination of all considerations of intent
in disparate impact,186 the more appropriate response, in light of
the importance of disparate impact in smoking out well-disguised
discriminatory intent,187 is to clarify the disparate impact standard
under the FHA and explicitly define when evidence of intent can
be relevant to disparate impact claims. Unfortunately, none of the
standards currently employed by the circuit courts prove adequate
in this endeavor.
A. Examining the Current Standards Employed by the Circuit
Courts: Pros and Cons
Although all circuit courts that have addressed the issue agree
that the FHA allows disparate impact claims, the circuit courts

183. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,480 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
184. Id.
185. See Brit T. Brown, Common Sense Tips for Avoiding Litigation,
BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSONS, L.L.P. (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.bmpllp.com
/publications/37-common-sense-tips-avoiding-litigation, archived at http://perma
.cc/879V-BDDD.
186. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1144.
187. Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 1299; Primus, supra note 162, at 520. See
also Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“[C]lever men may easily conceal their motivations . . . .”); Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Often, such
rules bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful
discriminatory mechanisms when applied.”); Rotem, supra note 21, at 1990
(“[O]ften intent to discriminate is difficult to prove.”).
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vary in how they analyze such claims.188 For instance, HUD and a
number of federal courts of appeals endorse a burden-shifting
approach similar to that used in the employment context as the
correct standard for analyzing FHA disparate impact claims.189
Other circuits abandon burden-shifting altogether in favor of a
balancing test,190 while others have decided to merge the two.191
Finally, one circuit court has utilized different tests based on
whether the defendant is a public or private entity—using the
burden-shifting approach for private defendants and the balancing
test for public defendants.192 As a result, courts in different regions
of the country can reach different outcomes on similar sets of
facts.193 Additionally, entities engaged in housing transactions lack
a clear guide for how to act in order to avoid litigation as they do
not know under what circumstances they can justify housing
procedures with a discriminatory effect.194
1. The Burden-Shifting Approach
The burden-shifting analysis closely mirrors the standard for
employment discrimination outlined in the Civil Rights Act of
188. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
189. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www
.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); HUD v. Twinbrook Vill. Apts.,
Nos. 02-00-0256-8, 02-00-0257-8, 02-00-0258-8, 2001 WL 1632533, at *17 (HUD
ALJ Nov. 9, 2001); HUD v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, Nos. 08-920010-1, 08-92-0011-1, 1993 WL 367102, at *6 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 1993);
Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939; Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d
43, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2000).
190. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055,
1065 (4th Cir. 1982).
191. See, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro
Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2007); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir.
1995).
192. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1984).
193. See Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix
Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1434, 1454–
57 (2012) (demonstrating how the different circuits’ standards can reach
different results through the example of Gallagher v. Magner).
194. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,480 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
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1991.195 Under this analysis—also known as the McDonnellDouglas framework196—the initial burden is on the plaintiff to
provide statistical data demonstrating that the questioned practice
has a disparate impact.197 If the plaintiff can do so, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to establish a justification for the action.198
The defendant must show that it has a legitimate reason for its
actions and that the practices employed bear a manifest
relationship to that legitimate interest.199 If the defendant can meet
this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
reasonable, less-discriminatory alternative means are available for
accomplishing the same goal.200
This approach provides a clear and workable standard but fails
from a policy standpoint. The policy concern with this formulation
of the burden-shifting approach is the burden falling back onto the
plaintiff after the defendant shows that it has a legitimate reason
for its actions and that the practices employed bear a manifest
relationship to that legitimate interest. Instead, the defendant
should have to show that no less-discriminatory alternatives exist
as a part of the second step of the analysis. Under this approach,
the defendant would carry the burden of persuasion after the prima
facie case is made.201 Indeed, some courts already use this
formulation of the burden-shifting approach.202 In this analysis, the
195. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
939 (2d Cir. 1988); Bain, supra note 193, at 1469.
196. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
197. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir.
2003).
198. Id.
199. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 384 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he defendant ‘must
demonstrate that the proposed action has ‘a manifest relationship’ to the
legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives . . . .’”).
200. Oti Kaga, 342 F.3d at 883.
201. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
939 (2d Cir. 1988).
202. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d
442, 468 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the government must show that “no
alternative would serve the interest with less discriminatory effect”); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–49 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he defendant
must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would
enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact.”); Huntington
Branch, 844 F.2d at 939 (“[A] defendant must present bona fide and legitimate
justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternatives available.”);
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F.
Supp. 2d 312, 322–23 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014),
cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL. (“[D]efendants must prove two
essential elements. First, they must prove that their interest is bona fide and
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defendant bears the last two burdens—it must show that a
legitimate interest justifies its actions and that less-discriminatory
means do not exist.203
As the Second Circuit aptly noted in Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the three-step burden-shifting
approach is an intent-based standard that is inapposite for disparate
impact use.204 Unlike disparate treatment, where the plaintiff must
overcome the defendant’s evidence of legitimate intent to prove a
discriminatory intent, the lynchpin of disparate impact is the
plaintiff’s proof of a disproportionate effect on members of a
protected class.205 Plaintiffs bear this burden in the initial step, and
everything that occurs afterwards is an attempt by the defendant to
justify the discriminatory effect, analogous to an affirmative
defense.206 Typically, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense
lies with the defendant,207 and thus in disparate impact cases, the
burden of proof for overcoming the existence of a discriminatory
effect should also lie with the defendant. Consequently, a two-step
approach corresponds more appropriately to disparate impact
cases—the plaintiff provides statistical evidence of a practice’s
discriminatory effects, and then the defendant has the opportunity to
overcome that evidence by showing that the practice has a manifest
relationship to a legitimate interest and that less-discriminatory
alternatives do not exist. One scholar in particular has lauded this
approach, noting that it is “both fair and logical” for defendants to
“shoulder[] the burden of proving the action taken was a necessity”
as “[t]he plaintiff has the manageable burden of proving a positive—
that the act has a disparate impact.”208 The two-step burden-shifting
framework would provide a significant improvement; however, it
still lacks an essential element: intent.

legitimate. Second, they must prove there are no less discriminatory alternatives
. . . .”).
203. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939.
204. Id. (“The McDonnell Douglas test . . . is an intent-based standard for
disparate treatment cases inapposite to the disparate impact claim asserted
here.”).
205. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining that Title
VII prohibits practices that have a disparate impact or a “disproportionately
adverse effect on minorities”); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543
(11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] showing of a significant discriminatory effect suffices to
demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act.”).
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
207. See 9A AM. JUR. 2D Pl. & Pr. Forms Evidence § 128 (Westlaw 2014).
208. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 13, at 84.
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2. The Relevance of Intent
The essential element missing from the burden-shifting
standard is a mechanism for dealing with cases where the
defendant has cloaked its discriminatory intent in actions bearing a
manifest relationship to a legitimate interest. Disparate impact
provides a tool for smoking out such well-hidden discriminatory
intent that cannot be addressed by a disparate treatment claim.209
The disparate impact standard therefore needs a mechanism for
dealing with such cases.
Take for instance the case of Affordable Housing Development
Corp. v. City of Fresno, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury’s
denial of FHA liability when the City of Fresno declined to
approve housing bonds for the construction of a low-income,
multi-family apartment building known as Wellington Place,210
which would have been the only low-income building in northwest
Fresno and the only one outside of the inner city.211 The City
denied the application purportedly on the grounds that the building
would bring down local property values and that there was a lack of
need for the project.212 Although the jury found that the City’s denial
had a disproportionate effect on low-income minorities, it determined
(and the court of appeals agreed) that the City’s reasons constituted a
legitimate justification for the disproportionate effect on minorities and
that less-discriminatory practices did not exist.213 Based on these facts
alone, this case appears to be a straightforward, appropriate
decision based on the City’s choice to protect its residents’
property values. However, plaintiffs brought forth relevant
evidence of discriminatory intent for their disparate treatment
claim that should not have been ignored in the disparate impact
context.214
Despite the Housing Authority’s initial approval of the
application, a newly elected councilman began attempts to kill the
project soon after taking office.215 These attempts included the
councilman’s distribution of flyers containing inflammatory
statements telling residents to protest “Affordable Housing . . . in
209. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
210. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1188–89
(9th Cir. 2006).
211. Appellants A.H.D.C.’s and Ashwood Construction’s Opening Brief at 7,
16, Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
2006) (No. CIV-F-97-5498) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief].
212. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d at 1196.
213. Id. at 1191–96.
214. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 211, at 8–15.
215. Id. at 9.
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your backyard,” and his announcement that the Wellington would
allow “low-income families with children to live near his
constituents’ neighborhood and attend ‘their’ schools.”216 These
efforts stirred up residents and led to residents making
discriminatory outbursts during public meetings concerning the
project: “We are going to end up with a lot of kids, with these large
bedrooms at Wellington because those Hmongs217 have a lot of
kids”; “All the Hmongs have 13 children”; and referring to one
proponent of the project as a “spic.”218 The council thereafter cited
community opposition as one reason for the denial.219 The jury
determined, well within its discretion, that such evidence did not
constitute a preponderance of the evidence necessary to find that a
discriminatory intent motivated the project’s denial.220 However, in
light of the substantial discriminatory effect and the evidence of
discriminatory intent potentially motivating the City’s decision, it
is at least plausible, and even likely, that the council’s stated
reasons were simply a pretext for discrimination. Courts and juries
should have the opportunity to consider such evidence within the
framework of disparate impact. The other two standards employed
by the circuit courts provide that opportunity.
3. The Balancing Test
Under the balancing test, the analysis is far less formulaic.
Instead, courts consider four primary factors: “(1) the strength of
plaintiffs’ showing of discriminatory impact; (2) a quantum of
evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant’s interest in
the challenged conduct; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks
affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain defendants from
interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.”221
The court looks at each factor and determines which party that
factor favors.222 It then weighs the four factors together to reach its
conclusion as to whether the practice violates the FHA.223 This
216. Id. at 9–10 (alterations omitted).
217. The United States Census Bureau counts persons identifying themselves
as “Hmongs” as being of the “Asian” race. Id. at 13 n.7.
218. Id. (alterations omitted).
219. See id. at 10. The influx of new children and community opposition
were the reasons the City killed the Wellington project. Id.
220. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1191
(9th Cir. 2006).
221. Bain, supra note 193, at 1446 n.83 (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
222. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290–93 (7th Cir. 1977).
223. Id. at 1293–94.
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approach gives judges the ability to address signs of discriminatory
pretext if necessary, but it falters by allowing for too much
subjectivity because the courts have received little guidance as to
how much weight each factor should receive.224
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in Langlois
v. Abington Housing Authority, this approach allows individual
judges to make significant policy choices by deciding which
criteria are more important or worthy.225 For this reason, uniform
interpretation of the FHA and consistent analyses of FHA disparate
impact claims would prove nearly impossible under a balancing
test as different judges would emphasize different factors.
Furthermore, inconsistent analyses of disparate impact claims
undermine one of the primary goals of implementing a single
standard: making those involved in housing transactions aware of
their rights and obligations.226
Moreover, as the court in Langlois correctly pointed out,
having federal judges decide such policy issues is “to impose on
them the job of making decisions that are properly made by
Congress or its executive-branch delegates.”227 If Congress were to
endorse a balancing test, it would reflect its inability and
unwillingness to do its job, instead handing that task over to the
judiciary, which, although not unprecedented, proves undesirable
because the judiciary has already shown a distaste for disparate
impact.228 Finally, “the balancing approach is in tension with the
course taken by the Supreme Court and Congress under Title VII
where a standard of justification is constructed and applied.”229
Courts considering disparate impact claims under the FHA need
not, and should not, treat them identically to those under Title VII,
but they should treat them similarly.230

224. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000).
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
227. Langlois, 207 F.3d at 51.
228. See supra Part II.A. It was this same sentiment that led Congress to
amend Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The legislature wanted to
take such policy decisions out of the court’s hands and place it in the hands of
juries. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
229. Langlois, 207 F.3d at 51.
230. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[S]imilar claims under
Title VII and the FHA generally should receive similar treatment.”).

2014]

COMMENT

247

4. The Hybrid Approach
The hybrid approach combines aspects of both the burdenshifting approach and the balancing test.231 The first two steps in
the hybrid method reflect the burden-shifting approach, while the
final step borrows from the balancing test.232 First, a plaintiff must
make out a prima facie case by presenting evidence that the
questioned practice has a disparate impact.233 Thereafter, the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate interest
and show that no alternative practices could accomplish the same
end.234 The court then balances two other factors to determine
whether actionable discrimination has occurred.235 The first factor
that courts consider is whether the plaintiff has any evidence of
discriminatory intent.236 Next, the court considers the form of relief
the plaintiff seeks to determine whether public policy implications
may weigh against siding in the plaintiff’s favor.237 The court then
weighs the last two considerations in light of the evidence
presented by both parties in the balancing phase to reach its
ultimate conclusion.238
This mechanism for assessing disparate impact claims provides
the best and most effective standard of the three primary standards
employed by the courts of appeals for two reasons. First, it
provides a structured and objective method in the form of a twostep burden-shifting test. Secondly, it provides a means for courts
to consider evidence of intent to determine whether a facially
neutral practice is simply a pretext for discrimination. However,
the hybrid test still has faults.
The main problem with this test is that some courts seem to
mandate evidence of intent to support a claim of disparate
impact,239 which is at odds with the fundamental nature of the
231. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
936 (2d Cir. 1988).
232. See supra Parts III.A.1, 3.
233. Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 936.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1153 n.64 (citing Strykers Bay Neighborhood
Council v. City of New York, 695 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(dismissing disparate impact case on summary judgment, and not only noting
the failure of the plaintiffs to submit evidence of bad faith, but also pointing to
evidence of the defendants’ good faith)).
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disparate impact theory.240 Although the standard must retain the
flexibility to allow for evidence of intent or pretext in those cases
where facially neutral practices simply provide a well-designed
cover for discriminatory intent (such as in Affordable Housing
Development Corp. v. City of Fresno),241 a disparate impact
standard should not demand evidence of intent. The primary
purpose of the disparate impact theory is to prevent discrimination
based on facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects,
which by definition can survive without proof of a discriminatory
intent. A standard that requires evidence of intent renders disparate
impact meaningless by equating it with disparate treatment.
Additionally, as part of the hybrid test, courts consider the form
of relief requested by the plaintiffs in making their judgment as to
whether a violation of the FHA occurred.242 The form of relief
sought by plaintiffs, though, has no bearing on whether
discrimination has occurred. If a court finds that a defendant lacks
a viable justification for its actions, that court should not have the
ability to reverse course and find in favor of the defendant simply
because it does not want to force the defendant to take a certain
action.243 Including this element in the standard simply provides an
excuse for courts to ignore discriminatory actions.
Proponents of this fourth element argue that courts should
“move reluctantly and cautiously” when considering whether to
compel a defendant to undertake “affirmative, involuntary
action.”244 Although forcing municipalities or private entities to
take affirmative steps may seem extreme, in certain instances
action is required to reverse the effects of discriminatory practices.
Some may fear that allowing such judicial action will subject every
town or city to liability if it refuses to provide mixed-income
housing or similar developments. However, the legislature can
assuage such fears by providing a clear definition of the
“practices” that plaintiffs may challenge.245 A positive definition of
the term will prevent plaintiffs from subjecting entities to liability
240. See supra Part I.B.
241. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
2006).
242. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
243. See Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1986)
(referencing district court decision which found plaintiff’s claims moot based on
the type of relief they sought).
244. United States v. Hous. Auth. of City of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716,
732 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Gregory Brumfield, A Closer Look at the Fair Housing
Act of 1968: Can the Disparate Impact Theory Affect the Urban Crisis in the
City of New Orleans, 37 S.U. L. REV. 41, 59 (2009).
245. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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for a lack of decision-making, thus shielding entities not actively
engaged in discriminatory policy-making. Consequently, an
element relating to the type of relief sought is not required in an
effective disparate impact standard.
B. Proposing a Proper Standard: The Modified Burden-Shifting
Approach
The best disparate impact standard would be similar to the
hybrid approach but without the fourth factor that considers the
form of relief sought by the plaintiff. This “modified burdenshifting approach” takes the two-step form of the burden-shifting test
and modifies it by adding a final pretext consideration, if necessary, in
which the plaintiff can introduce evidence of intent that, although
insufficient to meet the disparate treatment preponderance of the
evidence standard,246 indicates a potential ulterior motive on the part
of the defendant.
In the first step, the plaintiff must make a prima facie statistical
showing that the challenged practice has a disparate impact on a
protected class. If the plaintiff can meet that burden, then the defendant
must show that the practice is necessary—i.e., that there are no lessdiscriminatory alternatives—to achieve a legitimate interest. If the
defendant fails to meet that burden, the practice is a violation of the
FHA. However, if the defendant can meet that burden, the practice
will not violate the FHA unless the plaintiff has sufficient evidence
of discriminatory intent. In order to prevail at this third step, the
plaintiff must demonstrate through a “strong basis in evidence”
that the facially neutral practice is in actuality motivated by
discriminatory intent. The “strong basis in evidence” standard is
best for this inquiry because the Court has already endorsed its use
with disparate impact,247 and it provides a more lenient standard
than “preponderance of the evidence” while also requiring that
plaintiffs have a legitimate, meaningful standard to attain so that
just any bare-bones evidence will not suffice.248 A strong basis in
evidence that the defendant acted intentionally, in conjunction with
significant discriminatory effects, should render a practice
unlawful.

246. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1162
(D.S.D. 2002). Under FHA disparate treatment standard, the plaintiff has “the
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons asserted by the defendants are in fact mere pretext.” Id. (emphasis added).
247. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009).
248. See generally Johnson, supra note 117.
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This standard for analyzing FHA disparate impact claims rises
above those standards currently employed by the circuit courts for
three main reasons: (1) its objective burden-shifting foundation
employs an equitable two-step, rather than three-step, formulation
that requires the defendant to show that less-discriminatory
alternatives do not exist; (2) it provides a third pretext element that
allows, but does not require, plaintiffs to argue that a defendant’s
facially neutral practice is simply a pretext for intentional
discrimination; and (3) it does not include any arbitrary, irrelevant
factors such as the type of relief that the plaintiff requests. In
practice, the modified burden-shifting standard will allow courts to
address the two types of discrimination that disparate impact has
traditionally tried to address: facially neutral practices with
inadvertent discriminatory effects and facially neutral practices
with discriminatory effects that are a result of well-hidden
discriminatory intent that falls outside the reach of a disparate
treatment claim.249
Consider again Affordable Housing Development Corp. v. City
of Fresno.250 The first step of the modified burden-shifting
standard would apply identically to that of the burden-shifting
standard used by the court in City of Fresno.251 The plaintiffs
would have to provide statistical evidence that the City’s practice
had a significant disproportionate effect on a protected class. In
City of Fresno, the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that the
City’s decision to deny funding had a discriminatory effect.252 If
the plaintiffs meet their burden, the burden would then shift to the
defendant. Under the modified burden-shifting framework, the
defendant must show that its practice had a manifest relationship to
a legitimate interest and that no other less-discriminatory
alternatives existed. In City of Fresno, the defendant met that
burden.
The City showed legitimate reasons for denying funding for the
project: the impact of a large rental unit on neighboring property
values and an arguable lack of need for the project.253 The City’s
decision displayed an obvious relationship to the legitimate
interest—it denied funding so as not to have an unneeded
apartment building constructed in an area where it would bring
down neighboring property values.254 Finally, because it was a
249. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part III.A.2.; see generally Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
251. See City of Fresno, 433 F.3d at 1194.
252. Id. (stating that A.H.D.C. “made a prima facie showing of discrimination”).
253. Id. at 1196.
254. See id.
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simple up-and-down vote, there were no alternative decisions the
City could have made regarding funding to achieve the same
end.255 Therefore, the City would meet its burden at the second
step of the modified-burden shifting approach. In most cases, this
would signal the end of the inquiry because although the plaintiff
identified a discriminatory effect resulting from the facially neutral
practice, the defendant presented a justifiable defense. As the
Ninth Circuit noted in City of Fresno, “[a] governmental interest in
not giving approval may outweigh the desirability of furnishing
low-rent housing.”256 This formulation allows entities engaged in
housing transactions to further legitimate interests despite the
existence of a disparate impact. The practice with a discriminatory
effect will be permitted as long as: (1) the entity is not covering for
discriminatory motives; and (2) it has done its due diligence on the
front end (in other words, it has determined that lessdiscriminatory alternatives do not exist).
However, the modified burden-shifting standard also has the
flexibility to assist plaintiffs possessing some evidence of
discriminatory intent that may not reach the preponderance of the
evidence level required for success in disparate treatment claims. In
the optional third step of this proposed standard, the plaintiff would
have the opportunity to bring forth evidence of discriminatory intent
that may have motivated the defendant’s adoption of the facially
neutral policy. Under this analysis, the trier of fact should determine
whether the evidence provides a “strong basis” for believing that the
defendant acted intentionally. A strong basis in evidence that the
defendant acted intentionally, in conjunction with significant
discriminatory effects, should render a practice unlawful.
In City of Fresno, the plaintiffs could have introduced their
evidence of intent under this third step and made it relevant to the
disparate impact determination. The City of Fresno appellant’s
brief reveals significant evidence showing that the community’s
negativity towards the housing development was largely racebased.257 Moreover, it demonstrates that one of the City’s reasons
for denying funding was the community opposition.258 Not only
does this establish that the City rejected the proposal at least partly
in response to the community’s discriminatory motivations, but it
also undercuts the “legitimate” interest argued at trial. Moreover, the
City had a policy of confining all low-income housing to its inner
city, which not only perpetuates segregation but also indicates a
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 1195–96.
Id. at 1196.
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 211, at 10–13.
Id.
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similar history of discriminatory motives.259 Accordingly, a trier of
fact could—and should—find a strong basis in evidence for the
proposition that discriminatory intent motivated the City’s decision.
The modified burden-shifting approach allows such evidence to
influence the outcome of disparate impact cases and hold entities
liable for discriminatory motives. This standard protects against
local governments’ discriminatory practices as described above,
and it also protects against the discriminatory practices of real
estate agents and financial institutions. Those entities often
perpetuate segregation by implementing facially neutral policies
that are simply a pretext for discrimination, such as racial
steering.260
Lending discrimination is a persistent problem, and lenders
have maneuvered around anti-discrimination laws by carefully
implementing race-neutral criteria that allow them to continue their
discriminatory lending patterns.261 For example, lenders can use
facially neutral criteria that have a known discriminatory effect to
deny loans to minorities seeking housing in traditionally white
neighborhoods.262 Or, as described in the example above where the
lending institution denied loans on all homes under $100,000,
lenders can find race-neutral criteria for denying loans to
minorities on a much wider scale.263 A Title VII-like burdenshifting framework would often permit such action because of the
facially neutral practice tailored toward the legitimate interest of
only handing out profitable loans. However, the modified burdenshifting test would allow plaintiffs in the final pretext step to
present evidence that the lender has simply found a roundabout
way to discriminate based on race. By maintaining the capacity to
punish well-designed pretexts, and by allowing for fair and
effective adjudication of disparate impact claims even when intent
plays no role, the modified burden-shifting approach rises above
the standards currently employed by the circuit courts.
Based on this Comment’s extensive comparison of the FHA to
Title VII, one could believe that the legislature, if it does act,
should implement an FHA standard identical to that used in Title
VII claims. Nevertheless, several factors weigh against an identical
259. Id. at 16.
260. “Racial steering” refers to housing providers’ practice of showing, or
providing funding for, homes to individuals in certain locations based on their
race. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366–70 (1982).
261. See generally Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending
Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995).
262. See id. at 822–23.
263. See supra Part I.B.
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standard. Courts considering disparate impact claims under the
FHA should treat them similarly, not identically.264
The first factor weighing against an identical standard is that
the defendant, rather than the plaintiff (as in Title VII), should
have to show that no less-discriminatory alternatives exist as a part
of the second step of the analysis.265 Second, the disparate impact
standard for FHA cases must differ from Title VII by including the
option of a third step for considering pretext because data indicates
that segregation in the workplace has begun to decrease,266 while
residential segregation remains pervasive.267
“The U.S. workforce is undoubtedly becoming more diverse,”268
and thus concerns over employers disguising discriminatory
motivations in facially neutral employment practices, although not
completely gone, should decrease. Studies have contended that this
increase in workplace diversity can contribute to employers becoming
more “cognizant of potentially racially biased behavior,”269 thus
signaling that employment discrimination should continue to
decrease. On the other hand, the prevalence of residential
segregation signifies, and data supports the conclusion, that
discriminatory housing practices continue to occur regularly.270
The third step of the modified burden-shifting approach is
designed to address such situations—among others—as those
where financial institutions purport to base loan decisions on raceneutral profitability data but in actuality manipulate factors in
determining creditworthiness to maintain the status quo of
segregated neighborhoods. The pervasiveness of residential
segregation and the smarmy tactics used by entities engaged in
housing transactions commands that the FHA standard deviate
from the Title VII standard.
Lest one accept the contention that disparate impact under the
FHA should differ from that of Title VII yet insist that the
264. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[S]imilar claims under
Title VII and the FHA generally should receive similar treatment.”).
265. See supra Part III.A.1.
266. See Crosby Burns, Kimberly Barton, & Sophia Kerby, The State of
Diversity in Today’s Workforce: As Our Nation Becomes More Diverse So Too
Does Our Workforce, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 12, 2012), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/07/12/11938/the-state
-of-diversity-in-todays-workforce/, archived at http://perma.cc/B4RW-F366.
267. See generally Vanhemert, supra note 6.
268. See generally Burns et al., supra note 266.
269. Elizabeth Hirsh & Christopher J. Lyons, Perceiving Discrimination on
the Job: Legal Consciousness, Workplace Context, and the Construction of Race
Discrimination, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 269, 278 (2010).
270. Cable, supra note 1. See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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modified burden-shifting standard simply strays too far, it should
be noted that inclusion of a pretext element in disparate impact
claims is well-established in multiple jurisdictions. Two of the
standards currently employed by the courts of appeals, the
balancing test and the hybrid approach, utilize such a
component.271 Furthermore, under Canadian law, courts use a
single, uniform standard for analyzing employment discrimination
claims, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges disparate
treatment or disparate impact.272 The standard contains a good faith
element, thus allowing Canadian courts to consider evidence of
intent when evaluating disparate impact claims.273 Accordingly,
this is an element that many jurisdictions, as well as scholars,274
consider useful in evaluating a defendant’s justification.
Additionally, as noted above, scholars and courts also support the
use of a two-step burden-shifting foundation for the disparate
impact standard.275 Hence, codification of the modified burdenshifting standard would not be a drastic departure from how some
courts currently handle FHA disparate impact cases, and it proves
a far better fit than the standard used under Title VII. This standard
allows courts the flexibility to consider evidence of intent, when
necessary, to flush out those practices that appear neutral but truly
cover for an actor’s discriminatory motive.
C. Codification: Incorporation of the Modified Burden-Shifting
Approach Into an FHA Amendment
With respect to the inclusion of the modified burden-shifting
standard in an FHA amendment, the legislature should look to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 for guidance because the Act provides a
good starting point in terms of structure.276 The proposed
amendment, included in Appendix A, would mesh the disparate
impact language provided by Schwemm and Pratt277 with language
supporting the modified burden-shifting standard and incorporate it
into the structure supplied by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.278 The
most significant change, outside of replacing employment law
language with fair housing language, comes in part (1)(A) where
271. See supra Part III.A.
272. See British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission)
v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 48 (Can.).
273. See id.
274. See Primus, supra note 162, at 520; Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 1299.
275. See supra Part III.A.1.
276. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
277. See supra Part II.B.
278. See Appendix A.
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the modified burden-shifting standard, in clear and concise terms,
explains how courts should analyze—and allocate the burden of
proof in—FHA disparate impact cases.279 The ambiguous and
confusing language used to explain the standard for employment
cases is eliminated to include the following standard for FHA cases:
Burden of proof in discriminatory impact cases:
(1) (A) An unlawful housing practice based on disparate
impact is established under this subchapter if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular housing practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
national origin, or handicap; and
(ii) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice has a legally sufficient
justification;280 or
(iii) the complaining party introduces enough
evidence of discriminatory intent to form a
strong basis that respondent’s legally sufficient
justification is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.
This amendment to the FHA will provide clear support for the
use of the disparate impact theory under the FHA, while also
supplying courts with a clear and uniform standard for the equitable
adjudication of FHA disparate impact claims. Residential
segregation has persisted for too long, and with the Supreme Court
poised to put an end to disparate impact under the FHA, Congress
must respond by codifying the theory and the modified burdenshifting approach within the Fair Housing Act.
CONCLUSION
“It is all about ‘here’ . . . that is the way we have to think about
social issues.”281 Minnijean Brown-Trickey, one of the “Little
279. See id.
280. See id. A “legally sufficient justification” is one that: (A) furthers one or
more of the user’s legitimate, non-discriminatory interests; and (B) cannot be
served by an alternative practice with a less discriminatory impact. SCHWEMM &
PRATT, supra note 104, at 29.
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Rock Nine” who helped to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High
School in 1957, conveyed this message on January 17, 2014, while
speaking at an event honoring the birthday of Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr.282 Her words aptly fit the situation confronting this
country with regards to its housing patterns. As the 2010 Census
data maps indicate, residential segregation remains pervasive in
this country.283 The only change likely to come is the Supreme
Court’s elimination of disparate impact claims under the FHA in
Inclusive Communities,284 which will only serve to reinforce the
status quo of segregation by removing a major tool needed for
purging the epidemic. Doomsday is looming with Inclusive
Communities sitting before the Justices, and Congress cannot allow
a crushing blow from the Court or another shortsighted settlement
to continue to emasculate the FHA—an amendment to the FHA is
a must no matter the outcome.
This Comment’s proposed amendment will not only guarantee
the disparate impact cause of action for plaintiffs, but it will also
clarify and improve the effectiveness of the law by implementing a
modified burden-shifting standard for analyzing disparate impact
claims under the FHA. The modified burden-shifting standard has
the capacity to address facially neutral practices with a
discriminatory effect, whether that effect is inadvertent, or whether
the actor intended it and used the facially neutral practice as a
pretext for his or her discriminatory motive. It also provides an
objective framework closely correlated to the FHA’s underlying
purpose of ensuring fair housing for all.285 If Congress is finally
willing to stand behind its rhetoric and put an end to residential
segregation, the first step in that direction is to codify disparate
impact and the modified burden-shifting standard. The opportunity
is here, and the time is now.

281. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, At MLK Event, One of “Little Rock Nine”
Discusses Desegregation, Social Activism, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (Jan. 18, 2014,
1:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/01/at_mlk_event_one
_of_little_roc.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VBB2-DG8R (quoting
Minnijean Brown-Trickey).
282. Id.
283. See Cable, supra note 1.
284. See supra Part II.A.
285. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Amendment to the Fair Housing Act Including Disparate
Impact Language and the Modified Burden Shifting Standard286
Unjustified discriminatory impact: Prohibited actions for purposes
of this subsection include:
(1) employing any practice that has an adverse impact based on
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or
handicap unless that practice is shown by the party employing
it to have a legally sufficient justification.
Burden of proof in discriminatory impact cases:
(1) (A) An unlawful housing practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular housing practice that has an adverse
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, national origin, or handicap; and
(ii) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice has a legally sufficient justification; or
(iii) the complaining party introduces enough evidence of
discriminatory intent to form a strong basis that
respondent’s legally sufficient justification is a pretext
for unlawful discrimination.
(B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular housing
practice causes a disparate impact as described in
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall
demonstrate that each particular challenged housing
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent's decision making process are
not capable of separation for analysis, the decision
making process may be analyzed as one housing
practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific housing
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to meet its burden
outlined in subparagraph (A)(ii).
286. The structure and much of the language used for this sample statute is
borrowed from that used in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the work of Robert
G. Schwemm and Sara K. Pratt in Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing
Act: A Proposed Approach. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012); SCHWEMM &
PRATT, supra note 104, at 28–29.
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(2) A demonstration that a housing practice is required as the
necessary means to a legitimate business or governmental
interest may not be used as a defense against a claim of
intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
For purposes of this subsection:
(1) “practice” includes any practice, policy, procedure, process,
standard, elements of practices, policies, procedures, processes,
or standards that are not capable of being separated for
analysis, and any other action that is intended to evaluate or
affect a group of persons.
(2) “adverse impact” means a substantially different rate of
selection which works to the disadvantage of members of a race,
sex, ethnic group, religion, [etc.]. The term “substantially”
means the same as it has been interpreted in prior judicial and
HUD administrative decisions under this Act and in prior
judicial decisions and administrative regulations under Title VII.
(3) A “legally sufficient justification” is one that:
(A) furthers one or more of the user’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests; and
(B) cannot be served by an alternative practice with a less
discriminatory impact.
(4) A “legally sufficient justification” must:
(A) bear a manifest relationship to the practice that is challenged;
and
(B) have a significant correlation with important elements of
the operation of the housing opportunity or business; and
(C) involve a matter of substantial concern to the operation of
the housing opportunity or business; and, be more effective
in accomplishing its purpose than any less discriminatory
alternative.
(5) A “legally sufficient justification” may not be hypothetical,
speculative, or insubstantial.
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